

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF SOUTH CAROLINA

Dwayne Deleston, # 96350-071)	C/A No. 6:09-3185-DCN-WMC
<i>aka Dwayne Curtis Deleston,</i>)	
)	
Petitioner,)	
)	
vs.)	Report and Recommendation
)	
United States of America; Jackson Seth Whipper,)	
Esq.,)	
)	
Respondent.)	
_____)	

Petitioner ("Deleston") files this petition for writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 seeking copies of the transcript from the grand jury who indicted him. Deleston alleges he was denied exculpatory evidence which would have allowed him to prepare a proper defense for his 1999 criminal trial.

BACKGROUND

On October 30, 2000, Deleston pled guilty to one count of possessing with intent to distribute fifty grams or more of crack cocaine. On January 19, 2001, the court sentenced him to the statutory mandatory minimum of 240 months imprisonment, plus ten years of supervised release and a \$100 special assessment. The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit denied his direct appeal on November 30, 2001, and the United States Supreme Court denied certiorari on April 1, 2002.

Since that time, Deleston has steadfastly and repeatedly attempted to attack his conviction and sentence through post-conviction proceedings. In fact, in one instance,

Deleston filed a § 2255 motion while the indictment under which he was charged was still pending on the docket. On January 2, 2002, he filed a motion pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2) and 28 U.S.C. § 1651(a), which the court construed as a 28 U.S.C. § 2255 motion and dismissed on November 12, 2002. Deleston subsequently filed a section 2255 motion on November 18, 2002, and the court dismissed that motion as successive. Deleston appealed those decisions, and the Fourth Circuit vacated and remanded based on the court's failure to provide notice of its decision to re-characterize defendant's first motion and the consequences of doing so. *United States v. Deleston*, 116 Fed. Appx. 454, 2004 WL 2677050 (4th Cir. Nov.24, 2004). Deleston then filed another section 2255 motion on December 20, 2004, which the court considered on the merits and dismissed on May 2, 2005.

After the resolution of Deleston's § 2255 on the merits, he nonetheless has relentlessly filed many more § 2255 motions (either explicitly titled as such or otherwise so designated by the court), as well as various other motions considered either by this court or the Fourth Circuit. Deleston filed his latest § 2255 motion on June 8, 2009, accompanied by a motion for an evidentiary hearing, and a motion for recusal. The court entered its order granting the government's motion to dismiss, dismissed the § 2255 motion, and denied Deleston's motions for evidentiary hearing and for recusal on December 9, 2009. Deleston now files the instant § 2241 petition **six (6) days after that order was entered** making this the eighth motion he has filed seeking to challenge the same conviction and sentence.

DISCUSSION

Under established local procedure in this judicial district, a careful review has been made of the *pro se* petition to the procedural provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1915, 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”), and other habeas corpus statutes. The review has been conducted in light of the following precedents: *Denton v. Hernandez*, 504 U.S. 25, 112 S.Ct. 1728 (1992); *Neitzke v. Williams*, 490 U.S. 319 (1989); *Haines v. Kerner*, 404 U.S. 519 (1972); *Nasim v. Warden, Maryland House of Correction*, 64 F.3d 951 (4th Cir. 1995)(*en banc*), *cert. denied*, *Nasim v. Warden, Maryland House of Correction*, 516 U.S. 1177 (1996); *Todd v. Baskerville*, 712 F.2d 70 (4th Cir. 1983); and *Boyce v. Alizaduh*, 595 F.2d 948 (4th Cir. 1979)(recognizing the district court’s authority to conduct an initial screening of a *pro se* filing).¹ *Pro se* complaints and petitions are held to a less stringent standard than those drafted by attorneys, *Gordon v. Leeke*, 574 F.2d 1147, 1151 (4th Cir.), *cert. denied*, *Leeke v. Gordon*, 439 U.S. 970 (1978), and a federal district court is charged with liberally construing a complaint or petition filed by a *pro se* litigant to allow the development of a potentially meritorious case. *See Hughes v. Rowe*, 449 U.S. 5, 9-10 & n. 7 (1980)(*per curiam*); and *Cruz v. Beto*, 405 U.S. 319 (1972). When a federal court is evaluating a *pro se* complaint, petition, or pleading, the plaintiff’s or petitioner’s allegations are assumed to be true. *Fine v. City of New York*, 529 F.2d 70, 74 (2nd Cir. 1975). However, even under this less stringent standard, the § 2241

¹ *Boyce* has been held by some authorities to have been abrogated in part, on other grounds, by *Neitzke v. Williams*, 490 U.S. 319 (1989)(insofar as *Neitzke* establishes that a complaint that fails to state a claim, under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), does not by definition merit *sua sponte* dismissal under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i) [formerly 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d)], as “frivolous”).

petition, which raises claims under 28 U.S.C. § 2255, is subject to summary dismissal. The requirement of liberal construction does not mean that the court can ignore a clear failure in the pleading to allege facts which set forth a claim currently cognizable in a federal district court. *Weller v. Department of Social Services*, 901 F.2d 387 (4th Cir. 1990).

Additionally, the mandated liberal construction afforded to *pro se* pleadings means that if the court can reasonably read the pleadings to state a valid claim on which the petitioner could prevail, it should do so, but a district court may not rewrite a petition or pleading to include claims that were never presented, *Barnett v. Hargett*, 174 F.3d 1128, 1133 (10th Cir. 1999), or construct the petitioner's legal arguments for him, *Small v. Endicott*, 998 F.2d 411, 417-418 (7th Cir. 1993), or “conjure up questions never squarely presented” to the court. See *Beaudett v. City of Hampton*, 775 F.2d 1274, 1278 (4th Cir. 1985), *cert. denied*, 475 U.S. 1088 (1986). “If the petition be frivolous or patently absurd on its face, entry of dismissal may be made on the court's own motion without even the necessity of requiring a responsive pleading from the government.” *Raines v. United States*, 423 F.2d 526, 529 (4th Cir. 1970).

The enactment of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub.L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 (1996), amended 28 U.S.C. § 2255 to preclude successive applications for relief under the statute. *United States v. Winestock*, 340 F.3d 200, 204 (4th Cir.2003). Prior to enactment of 28 U.S.C. § 2255, the only way a federal prisoner could collaterally attack a federal conviction was through a petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. See *Triestman v. United States*, 124 F.3d 361, 373 (2nd Cir. 1997). In 1948, Congress enacted § 2255 primarily to serve as a more efficient and

convenient substitute for the traditional habeas corpus remedy. See *In re Dorsainvil*, 119 F.3d 245, 249 (3rd Cir. 1997)(collecting cases).

"[A] prisoner who challenges his federal conviction or sentence cannot use the federal habeas corpus statute at all but instead must proceed under 28 U.S.C. § 2255." *Waletzki v. Keohane*, 13 F.3d 1079, 1080, (7th Cir.1994). Since the petitioner is seeking relief from his conviction and sentence, the relief requested by the petitioner in the above-captioned matter is available, if at all, under 28 U.S.C. § 2255. See *United States v. Morehead*, 2000 WESTLAW® 1788398 (N.D.Ill., December 4, 2000):

Notwithstanding Bennett captioning this pleading under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 12(b)(2), this court must construe it as a motion attacking his sentence under 28 U.S.C. § 2255. Regardless of how a defendant captions a pleading, "any post-judgment motion in a criminal proceedings that fits the description of § 2255 ¶ 1 is a motion under § 2255...." *United States v. Evans*, 224 F.3d 670, 672 (7th Cir. 2000). In the pleading at bar, Bennett argues that the court did not have jurisdiction over his criminal case, which is one of the bases for relief under § 2255 ¶ 1. Therefore, this court must construe this motion as a § 2255 motion.

United States v. Morehead, supra.

Congress enacted § 2255 "because pertinent court records and witnesses were located in the sentencing district (and it was) impractical to require these petitions to be filed in the district of confinement". *Dumornay v. United States*, 25 F.3d 1056 (Table), 1994 WL 170752 (10th Cir. 1994). Thus, "the remedy provided by 2255 was intended to be as broad as that provided by the habeas corpus remedy". *Dumornay*, supra, citing *United States v. Addonizio*, 442 U.S. 178, 185 (1979). Since relief granted pursuant to § 2255 "is as broad as that of habeas corpus 'it supplants habeas corpus, unless it is shown to be inadequate or ineffective to test the legality of the prisoner's detention'".

Dumornay, supra, citing Williams v. United States, 323 F.2d 672, 673 (10th Cir. 1963), *cert. denied*, 377 U.S. 980 (1964). Clearly then, Deleston's remedy, which he surely is aware of, is through the filing of a § 2255 motion.

Even if the petitioner could avail himself of Section 2241, the petition would be dismissed because the petitioner has not exhausted his administrative remedies. With respect to his conviction, a remedy under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 could be sought only after the petitioner has exhausted his administrative remedies. See 28 C.F.R. §§ 542.10 through 542.16; *See also Martinez v. Roberts*, 804 F.2d 570, 571 (9th Cir. 1986)(federal prisoners are required to exhaust their federal administrative remedies prior to bringing a petition for habeas corpus relief in federal court). In the instant case, the petitioner has not established, or even alleged, that he has exhausted his administrative remedies. Accordingly, the petition would be summarily dismissed in any event, without prejudice, so the petitioner could exhaust his administrative remedies.

Additionally, the petitioner does not set forth any set of facts which could be construed to show that a second or successive § 2255 motion would be inadequate or ineffective, thereby allowing him to file a petition for writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals set forth the test to determine if a §2255 motion would be inadequate or ineffective in *In re Jones*, 226 F.3d 328, 333-34 (4th Cir.2000). The Court held that a petitioner must show that "(1) at the time of the conviction, settled law of this circuit or the Supreme Court established the legality of the conviction; (2) subsequent to the prisoner's direct appeal and first §2255 motion, the substantive law changed such that the conduct of which the prisoner was convicted is deemed not to be criminal; and (3) the prisoner cannot satisfy the gatekeeping provisions

of § 2255 because the new rule is not one of constitutional law.” *Jones, supra* @ 333-334. Petitioner has not set forth any set of facts which could be construed to meet the prongs announced in *Jones*. As a result, this court does not have jurisdiction to entertain the petitioner’s writ of habeas corpus filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241.

It is clear that if a prisoner’s § 2255 motion is denied by a sentencing court, the denial itself is not sufficient to demonstrate that the § 2255 motion was inadequate, or ineffective. *Williams, supra*. See also *In re Avery W. Vial* 115 F.3d 1192 (4th Cir. 1997) (remedy afforded by § 2255 is not rendered inadequate or ineffective because an individual has been unable to obtain relief under that provision, or because an individual is procedurally barred from filing a § 2255 motion); *Atehortua v. Kindt*, 951 F.2d 126 (7th Cir. 1991)(petitioner who has failed to demonstrate that § 2255 motion is inadequate to test the legality of his detention is barred from filing a habeas petition under § 2241).

Leave from the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit is now required under the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 for filers of successive or second § 2255 petitions. Before the petitioner attempts to file another petition in the United States District Court for the District of South Carolina, he **must** seek and obtain leave (*i.e.*, written permission) from the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit. The petitioner can obtain the necessary forms for doing so from the Clerk's Office of the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit in Richmond, Virginia.**

**See Section 106 of the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996:

(B) LIMITS ON SECOND OR SUCCESSIVE APPLICATIONS. –Section 2244(b) of title 28, UNITED STATES CODE, is amended to read as follows:

(continued...)

RECOMMENDATION

Accordingly, it is recommended that the § 2241 petition in the above-captioned case be dismissed *without prejudice* and without requiring the respondents to file a return. See

(...continued)

"(B)(1) A claim presented in a second or successive habeas corpus application under section 2254 that was presented in a prior application shall be dismissed.

"(2) A claim presented in a second or successive habeas corpus application under section 2254 that was not presented in a prior application shall be dismissed unless—

"(A) the applicant shows that the claim relies on a new rule of constitutional law, made retroactive to cases on collateral review by the Supreme Court, that was previously unavailable; or

"(B)(i) the factual predicate for the claim could not have been discovered previously through the exercise of due diligence; and

"(ii) the facts underlying the claim, if proven and viewed in light of the evidence as a whole, would be sufficient to establish by clear and convincing evidence that, but for constitutional error, no reasonable factfinder would have found the applicant guilty of the underlying offense.

"(3)(A) Before a second or successive application permitted by this section is filed in the district court, the applicant shall move in the appropriate court of appeals for an order authorizing the district court to consider the application.

"(B) A motion in the court of appeals for an order authorizing the district court to consider a second or successive application shall be determined by a three-judge panel of the court of appeals.

"(C) The court of appeals may authorize the filing of a second or successive application only if it determines that the application makes a prima facie showing that the application satisfies the requirements of this subsection.

"(D) The court of appeals shall grant or deny the authorization to file a second or successive application not later than 30 days after the filing of the motion.

"(E) The grant or denial of an authorization by a court of appeals to file a second or successive application shall not be appealable and shall not be the subject of a petition for rehearing or for a writ of certiorari.

"(4) A district court shall dismiss any claim presented in a second or successive application that the court of appeals has authorized to be filed unless the applicant shows that the claim satisfies the requirements of this section."

Allen v. Perini, 424 F.2d 134, 141 (6th Cir.)(federal district courts have duty to screen habeas corpus petitions and eliminate burden placed on respondents caused by ordering an unnecessary answer or return), *cert. denied*, 400 U.S. 906 (1970); *Baker v. Marshall*, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS® 4614, *2-*3 (N.D.Cal., March 31, 1995)("The District Court may enter an order for the summary dismissal of a habeas petition if it plainly appears from the face of the petition and any exhibits annexed to it that the petitioner is not entitled to relief in this Court."); and the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996.

s/William M. Catoe
United States Magistrate Judge

January 8, 2010

Greenville, South Carolina

The petitioner's attention is directed to the important notice on the next page.

Notice of Right to File Objections to Report and Recommendation

The parties are advised that they may file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation with the District Judge. Objections must specifically identify the portions of the Report and Recommendation to which objections are made and the basis for such objections. “[I]n the absence of a timely filed objection, a district court need not conduct a de novo review, but instead must ‘only satisfy itself that there is no clear error on the face of the record in order to accept the recommendation.’” *Diamond v. Colonial Life & Acc. Ins. Co.*, 416 F.3d 310 (4th Cir. 2005) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 72 advisory committee’s note).

Specific written objections must be filed within fourteen (14) days of the date of service of this Report and Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b); see Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(a), (d). Filing by mail pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5 may be accomplished by mailing objections to:

Larry W. Propes, Clerk
United States District Court
Post Office Box 10768
Greenville, South Carolina 29603

Failure to timely file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation will result in waiver of the right to appeal from a judgment of the District Court based upon such Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); *Thomas v. Arn*, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); *Wright v. Collins*, 766 F.2d 841 (4th Cir. 1985); *United States v. Schronce*, 727 F.2d 91 (4th Cir. 1984).